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Article 8

Custodial Choices for Children at Risk:
Bias, Sequentiality, and the Law
PEGGY COOPER DAVIS
GAUTAM BARUA

Children are at risk for many reasons. As Professor Straus has reported to
this Symposium, most adults in the United States accept the degrading violence
of corporal punishment, with its dangerous potential for escalation, as a
routine aspect of discipline and socialization. 1 Overwhelming numbers of
children live in poverty.2 Parental resources are sorely strained by unemployment and disability.3 The parental role is devalued 4 and often assumed with-

Peggy Cooper Davis is a professor of law at New York University and a former judge of
the Family Court of the State of New York. She is grateful to Rachel Atkin for research
assistance and to Dulcie Ingleton for administrative support. Gautam Barua is a Ph.D.
candidate in the Department of Economics at New York University. Research funding for
this Article was provided by the Filomen D'Agostino and Max E. Greenberg Research
Fund of New York University School of Law. @1995 Peggy Cooper Davis.
1. Murray A. Straus and Carrie L. Yodanis, Corporal Punishment by Parents:
Implications for Primary Prevention of Assaults on Spouses and Children, 2 U Chi L Sch
Roundtable 35, 38 (1995) (finding that nearly all parents frequently use corporal punishment on toddlers and that over half continue the use of corporal punishment into adolescence).
2. See Donald J. Hernandez, America's Children: Resources from Family, Government
and the Economy 265 (Russell Sage, 1993) (finding that in 1988 22.3 percent of white
children and 52.6 percent of black children lived in relative poverty and that 14.3 percent
of white children and 14.6 percent of black children lived in near-poor frugality); Manhattan Borough President's Advisory Council on Child Welfare, Failed Promises: Child
Welfare in New York City; A Look at the Past, A Vision for the Future 24 (1989)
(finding that one-third of all New York City children live below seventy-five percent of
the poverty line).
3. See Hernandez, America's Children at 357 (cited in note 2) ("Changes in fathers'
employment or disability status for white and black children were associated with 39-40
and 15-25 percent, respectively, of the transitions into or out of official poverty, while
changes in mothers' employment or disability status were associated with 16-22 and 27-33
percent, respectively, of transitions in the rates of official poverty."); The William T. Grant
Foundation Commission on Work, Family and Citizenship, The Forgotten Half- Pathways
to Success for America's Youth and Young Families 15-22 (1988) (documenting a "new
depression" among America's young families).
4. See Maxine L. Margolis, Mothers and Such: Views of American Women and Why
They Changed 184 (California, 1984) (arguing that child care and homemaking account
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out preparation' or planning.6 Alarming numbers of parents are impaired by
addiction' or mental illness.' These problems are exacerbated by the absence
of universal health care9 and the absence of an effective social safety net.1"
Moreover, some adults whom children encounter are sexually irresponsible"
or simply cruel.'" Government has a legitimate obligation, if not a constitutional duty, 3 to protect the youngest members of the national community

for twenty-five percent of the gross national product but are devalued by government
agencies and courts). See generally Jessie Bernard, The Future of Motherhood (Penguin,
1974).
5. Parenting training is, for the most part, provided only after parental failure rather
than as a regular part of elementary and secondary school curricula. The Carnegie Task
Force on Meeting the Needs of Young Children, Starting Points: Meeting the Needs of
Our Youngest Children 36 (1994).
6. See Charlotte F. Muller, Health Care and Gender 176 (Russell Sage, 1990) (reporting that for women interviewed in 1982-83, "39.6 percent of all births [to married or
previously married women] were either not wanted at conception or came sooner than
wanted").
7. See The Vera Institute of Justice, The Vera Institute Atlas of Crime and Justice in
New York City 41 (1993) (finding that in New York City "babies born to women admitting cocaine use increased from 625 in 1985 to 3,168 in 1989" and fell to 2,239 in
1991).
8. See Linda Whobrey Rohman, Bruce D. Sales, and Mimi Lou, The Best Interests of
the Child in Custody Disputes, in Lois A. Weithorn, ed, Psychology and Child Custody
Determinations 59, 90 (Nebraska, 1987) (finding that two-thirds of divorced parents
suffered moderate to severe psychological problems during marriage).
9. See Hernandez, America's Children at 256 (cited in note 2) (finding that in 1986
thirty-five percent of the poor, twenty-two percent of the near-poor, and seven percent of
the middle class were without health insurance); Permanent Judicial Commission on Justice
for Children, Report to Chief Judge Sol Wacbtler 2 (1992) (finding that twenty percent
of poor children in New York are not covered by Medicaid or other health insurance).
10. See Manhattan Borough President's Advisory Council on Child Welfare, Failed
Promises at 34-35 (cited in note 2) (finding that the number of treatment programs for
addicted parents is inadequate); id at 46-47 (documenting the inadequacies of social
services for families at risk for foster care placements); id at 32-33 (reporting foster care
placements as a result of homelessness); Permanent Judicial Commission, Report to Judge
Wacbtler at 2 (cited in note 9) (finding that sixty percent of poor three to five year olds
receive no publicly-funded preschool services).
11. See, for example, Barbara Snow and Teena Sorenson, Ritualistic Child Abuse in a
Neighborhood Setting, 5 J Interpersonal Violence 474 (1990) (describing incest and ritual
sex rings in which children were victimized by religious and community leaders); Max Sugar, Abuse and Neglect in Schools, 44 Am J Psychotherapy 484 (1990) (documenting cases
of sexual abuse of students by teachers); James Rosenthal, et al, A Descriptive Study of
Abuse and Neglect in Out-of-Home Placement, 15 Child Abuse & Neglect 249 (1991)
(documenting sexual abuse in foster homes, group homes, residential treatment centers, and
institutions); Leslie Margolin, Sexual Abuse by Grandparents, 16 Child Abuse & Neglect
735 (1992).
12. Jane Morgan and Lucia Zedner, Child Victims: Crime, Impact and Criminal Justice
23 (Oxford, 1992) (reporting that from 1982 to 1984 Americans aged twelve to nineteen
experienced 3,700,000 thefts and 1,800,000 violent crimes per year, experiencing victimization rates approximately twice as high as those of the adult population).
13. See DeShaney v Winnebago County, 489 US 189 (1989) (holding that states have
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against neglect and abuse.
Nonetheless, most children thrive in parental care and suffer harm if that
care is significantly interrupted. 4 Moreover, the liberty, personal autonomy,
and diversity that are the human centerpiece of democracy in the United States
are compromised whenever government intrudes excessively in the lives of
families. ' s Paternalistic efforts of classical republicanism to develop ideal
citizens" and statist measures like the Chinese government's one-child policy,1 7 or the French government's announced intention to forbid post-meno-

pausal in-vitro fertilization," strike the American sensibility as excessive governance. The human capacity to make moral and social meaning implies a
human right to be socialized to moral autonomy in the intimate and relatively
flexible context of family rather than molded to norms imposed by an impersonal, homogenizing, and all-powerful state.1 9 As the Supreme Court announced in Pierce v Society of Sisters,20

[t]he fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this
Union repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize its
children. . . . The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who
nurture . . . [the child] and direct . . . [its] destiny have the right,
coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare . . . [it] for addi-

tional obligations."
It is "cardinal" in the United States that the "care and nurture of the child
reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include
preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder."'
When the state assumes a child-protective function, it takes on the exqui-

no affirmative constitutional duty to protect children against abuse).
14. The immediate trauma that a child experiences upon separatidn from its family is
undeniable. Long-term effects are assessed differently by different child development
specialists. The most influential, and one of the most extreme, statements on the effects
of separation can be found in Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Albert J. Solnit, Beyond
the Best Interests of the Child 32-34 (Free, 1979).
15. See Peggy Cooper Davis, Contested Images of Family Values: The Role of the
State, 107 Harv L Rev 1348 (1994); Peggy Cooper Davis, Neglected Stories and the

Lawfulness of Roe v. Wade, 28 Harv CR-CL L Rev 299, 393 (1993).
16. See Davis, 28 Harv CR-CL L Rev at 333 (cited in note 15).
17. For a balanced description of China's policy, see Pi-Chao Chen, Birth Planningand
Fertility Transition, 476 Annals Am Acad Pot & Soc Sci 128 (1984).
18. See Melinda Beck, et al, How Far Should We Push Mother Nature?, Newsweek
54, 54-55 (Jan 17, 1994); Catherine Ford, Reproductive Debate Masks Contempt for

Women, Ottawa Citizen B2 (Jan 9, 1994) (describing a bill before the French Senate and
National Assembly that provides that IVF and other medically assisted pro-creation techniques be used only by pre-menopausal women).
19. For a fuller discussion of the concept of meaning-making, see Davis, 107 Harv L
Rev at 1361-67 (cited in note 15).
20. 268 US 510 (1925).

21. Id at 535.
22. Prince v Massachusetts, 321 US 158, 166 (1944).
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sitely difficult task of deciding when intervention is reasonably necessary to the
physical or emotional well-being of a child and when it is destructive, both of
the bonds upon which the child depends for healthy nurturance and of the
child's right to grow in a community that is open, flexible, and self-defining,
rather than state-controlled. Every formal charge of child neglect or abuse
presents this difficulty in vivid microcosm.
The custodial decisions that judges make in these cases are, then, vitally
important to the well-being of children and to the character of the culture. It
is contended by many critics of child welfare systems that these decisions-and
the analogous decisions of clinicians, child care professionals, and child welfare
lawyers-are systematically biased. Some argue that a "child-saver" mentality,
institutional arrogance, and class and race prejudice create a bias in favor of
intervention, while others argue that excessive libertarianism, indifference to the
plight of children, and carelessness create a bias against intervention.23 As the
Supreme Court has suggested, the truth is undoubtedly between these two
uncharitably described poles.24 In the difficult and almost always well-intentioned business of protecting children from abuse, decisionmakers sometimes
fail to intervene when they should and sometimes intervene when they should
not.
.When a child dies or is severely injured at the hands of people against
whom complaints of neglect or abuse have been lodged, the child welfare
system and the general public become painfully aware of regrettable 5 failures
to intervene. To take a notorious example, when Joshua DeShaney was permanently and severely brain-damaged at the hands of an abusing father, a
shocked public learned that a state agency had failed to act upon strong
evidence of violent abuse-evidence that was reported by family members,
emergency room personnel, and neighbors and chronicled in twenty home visits
by a child welfare caseworker.26
Regrettable interventions come less easily to light. The sequelae of family
disruption are rarely visible to the court or to the public. Yet, they are
sometimes documented. Thus, we know that a child was removed from his
home because of a parental decision to send him to an all-black school, that
parental rights were terminated because a mother's uncomprehending anger
when her child was removed as the result of a single spanking was interpreted

23. Contrasting positions as to the wisdom of intervention are set out in Smith v
Organization of Foster Families, 431 US 816, 833-34 (1977).
24. Id at 838 n 41 ("[N]either [side] represents the whole truth about the [foster care]
system.").
25. The word "regrettable" is carefully chosen. A decision will be regretted when it
has bad consequences. Regrettable decisions are not, however, necessarily wrong decisions.
The rightness or wrongness of a decision can only be judged in terms of considerations
that the decisionmaker could or should have been aware of and relied upon. In an area
as complex as child welfare, efforts to avoid all regrettable decisions will necessarily be
futile. Efforts to avoid wrongful decisions are, however, appropriate and necessary.
26. DeShaney, 489 US at 208-09 (Brennan dissenting).
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by agency mental health experts as a symptom of instability, and that a family
was separated for more than three years because a mother's poverty, a common law marriage, and a speech impediment caused by a severe automobile
accident were taken for unfitness or incapacity. 27
We lack empirical data that would tell us which kind of error is more
frequent. Both kinds are tragic, and both may be attributable in part to
systemic bias in child custody decisionmaking.
Our critique of decisionmaking regarding children at risk is more charitable than that of the critics described above. We do not imagine decisionmakers
as thoughtless libertarians or as arrogant paternalists. Rather, we imagine that
subtle, systemic factors are responsible for at least some of the costly errors
that at times leave children to face unacceptable risks and at other times
impose upon children the trauma of unnecessary family disruption.
In the hope of identifying error-producing factors in child welfare proceedings, we create a simplified model of judicial decisionmaking. After describing
our simplified decision model, we identify a "sequentiality effect" that is
present when, as in most child protective proceedings, the ultimate question
before the decisionmaker is anticipated in one or more preliminary or pre-trial
proceedings. We also identify four factors that are likely to produce bias in
child protective decisionmaking: the perceived status quo at the time of
custodial choice; a heightened emphasis upon risks associated with decisions in
favor of the party (usually the respondent) with fewer litigation resources; the
fact that the litigation is understandably and inevitably focused upon the
possibility that the respondent has caused harm to the child; and the judge's
special vulnerability to negative feedback in the event of adverse consequences
from a failure to intervene. We then demonstrate the ways in which the sequentiality effect interacts with bias factors to compound errors made in the
early phases of decisionmaking. s Finally, we suggest measures that might be
taken to guard against systemic bias and against the reinforcement of error by
the sequentiality effect.
I. The Decision Framework
Our model of judicial decisionmaking is extremely simplified. The many
complex and difficult decisions that judges make in child protective proceedings are "boiled down" to a choice between intervention and non-intervention.
This simplified model is, of course, highly artificial. A judge does not choose
directly between intervention and non-intervention. S/he makes hundreds of
minor judgments of law and fact, culminating in temporary and final orders

27. These cases are described more fully in Peggy C. Davis and Richard G. Dudley,
Jr., The Black Family in Modern Slavery, 4 Harv Blackletter J 9, 10-14 (1987).

28. The focus of this Article is upon child protective proceedings, but the sequentiality
effect that we identify is of equal or greater importance in other contexts, like matrimonial
and adoption proceedings, in which custodial decisions are made on both temporary and
permanent bases.
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that authorize or preclude intervention. The identification of systemic bias in
our simplified model is nonetheless suggestive of systemic bias in actual
adjudications. This is so because a great many of the separate decisions that
comprise an adjudication of this kind conspicuously lead to, and are consciously perceived as a step toward, intervention or non-intervention.
An example will make the point more clearly. In an action alleging child
neglect on the basis of an unreasonable failure to provide necessary medical
care, the child protective agency might be required to prove the apparent
severity of the child's condition, the need for treatment, and the respondent's
ability to secure treatment. In particular, the agency might attempt to show
that the child manifested certain symptoms, that a certain diagnosis was
probable or later confirmed, and that the respondent had access to emergency
room services. The respondent might offer conflicting evidence concerning the
nature or conspicuousness of the symptoms, the diagnosis, and the feasibility
of obtaining treatment. Virtually all findings of fact and conclusions of law in
such a case will point, in obvious ways, toward intervention or non-intervention. Each of these decisions can be affected, therefore, by a bias in either
direction. If, for example, there is bias in favor of intervention, it will be
harder to convince the judge that the child's symptoms were masked; if there
is bias in favor of non-intervention, it will be harder to convince the judge
that the child's symptoms were conspicuous. If systemic biases are sufficiently
strong, and if they lead disproportionately in the same direction, their sum will
be a biased outcome.
We assume that the rule system under which the judge operates has the
intended function of maximizing the well-being of children by minimizing risks
of physical and psychological harm. The decision structured by this rule system
takes the form of a choice between intervention and non-intervention in a
process in which the risks to the child of each course are as fully considered
as is feasible. " In its definition of factors warranting intervention, the rule
system suggests a level of exigency below which intervention is likely to be
harmful and above which intervention may be beneficial." To return to the
example employed above, a statute that defines child neglect to include an
unreasonable failure to provide necessary medical care suggests that interven-

29. These assumptions will not reflect reality in all jurisdictions. In some, the governing
rule system will dictate greater tolerance of harms associated with one outcome than of
harms associated with the other. That sort of rule system would reflect legislative biases
analogous to the decisionmaking biases that we describe as risks for judicial
decisionmakers.
30. New York statutes defining abuse require, for example, that adjudications of abuse
be premised on findings that the respondent has inflicted serious physical injury, allowed
such injury to be inflicted, created or allowed a substantial risk of serious physical injury,
or committed or allowed a sex offense against the child. NY Family Court Act S 1012(e)
(McKinney 1983 & Supp 1994). Those defining neglect require that adjudications be
premised on findings that the child's condition has been impaired as a result of the
respondent's failure to exercise a minimum degree of care with respect to specified needs.
NY Family Court Act S 1012(f).
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tion will, in at least some cases, 1 be beneficial when a parent has unreasonably failed to provide necessary medical care. In the establishment of reasonable and fair procedures, the rule system assures that arguments for and
against intervention will be equally available to the court-that each side has
the means and the opportunity to persuade the court with respect to the facts
and the law. " In its constitutional requirements of procedural due process33
and family autonomy, 4 the rule system reinforces the requirement of fair
procedures and protects against unjustifiable criteria for intervention.
We regard as ideal decisionmaking that is objective or "unskewed." An
unskewed decision is one that takes appropriate account both of the risks to
the child of non-intervention and of the risks to the child of intervention,
responding equally to risks of equal magnitude. s Since our model assumes a
rule system in which equal consideration is required of equally serious risks of
each kind, the ideal of unskewed decisionmaking is built into the rules although, as we later argue,36 unskewed decisionmaking is not guaranteed by
the rules.
II. The Sequentiality Effect
In most child protective proceedings, custodial choices occur in series, The
judge must first choose whether to remove the children pending final adjudication or to leave them in their home.37 When the case has been tried, the
judge must decide whether the evidence warrants an assumption of jurisdiction

31. The typical statute will avoid a more inclusive suggestion by providing that even

in the face of such a finding the court has discretion to suspend judgement or to dismiss
the petition if dismissal is found to be in the best interests of the children. See, for
example, NY Family Court Act S 1052(b)(i)(A).
32. For a discussion of the appropriate scope of such laws, see Robert A. Burt,
Forcing Protection on Children and Their Parents: The Impact of Wyman v. James, 69
Mich L Rev 1259 (1971).
33. See Lassiter v Dep't of Social Services, 452 US 18 (1981) (holding that there is a
due process right, in sufficiently complex cases, to counsel in proceedings to terminate
parental rights); Santosky v Kramer, 455 US 745 (1982) (holding that the termination of
parental rights must be justified by clear and convincing evidence).
34. See text accompanying notes 20-22.
35. A state may also choose to take account of the risk of harm or injustice to
parents. We believe that it is more desirable that child protective matters be decided exclusively in light of the child's interests, with principles of family integrity and autonomy
considered in terms of the risks to the child of their compromise. Moreover, we believe
that the personal and political benefits of family autonomy are benefits that flow to children as well as to parents. See Davis, 107 Harv L Rev at 1371-72 (cited in note 15).
Our model is, however, easily adaptable to take account of parental interests.
36. See text accompanying notes 42-46.
37. The first judicial decision follows administrative and private decisions that are
equally difficult and equally subject to bias and error. Although the decisions of private
reporters and government child protective workers are outside the scope of this Article,
they too can embody and exacerbate the risks identified here with respect to judicial
decisionmaking.
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or a dismissal. If there is an assumption of jurisdiction, the judge must decide
whether the children should be in placement or in their home pending final
disposition. The dispositional decision will, then, represent in the usual case the
last of several decisions respecting custody. As we show more fully below,38
custodial decisions made at one stage of a child protective proceeding are likely to influence decisions at the next stage. An error at one stage is more likely
to be maintained or exaggerated than reversed. Hence, an error that is made
in the pre-trial custody decision, whichever way it goes, will tend to be selfstrengthening, so that the decision in the final stage of the case is more likely
to go in the direction of the initial decision. We will call this phenomenon the
"sequentiality effect."
In theory, the sequentiality effect could be a factor in any kind of litigation in which an interim decision is entered. In the context of custodial
decisionmaking, the sequentiality effect is doubly potent. In the ordinary case,
it is driven only by the status quo bias that is endemic to human
decisionmaking.39 In cases concerning custody, the status quo bias is reinforced by the child development principle that custodial change becomes
inherently and increasingly detrimental as the existing custodial arrangement
becomes more longstanding.4"
In light of the existence of the sequentiality effect, more is required of the
ideal decisionmaker than objectivity with respect to the ultimate decision. S/he
must also take the sequentiality effect into account and make efforts to avoid
its error-producing consequences. As we will show, reducing the error-producing consequences of the sequentiality effect can be achieved by (a) taking care
that early decisions are as balanced and accurate as possible (thus reducing the
risk of compoundable error) and by (b) taking care that a final disposition is
reached as expeditiously as is possible consistent with an appropriate standard
of thoroughness and care (thus minimizing the secondary compounding effect
of the maxim against custodial change).
The impact of the sequentiality effect varies across cases. If ultimately there
is very strong evidence supporting a decision that is contrary to the initial
custody award, the original decision will usually be reversed. This will be the
result unless the case has been protracted and the judge is convinced that the
child's bond to the interim custodian is so strong that the ultimate determination must be based upon continuity of care rather than upon parental fault.4

38. See text accompanying notes 67-68.
39. See text accompanying notes 47-56.
40. For the most influential statement of this principle, see Goldstein, Freud, and
Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests at 40-42 (cited in note 14).
41. In these cases, an original error has been compounded even if a correct final
decision has been made. This is so because the interests of the child vary across time as
the nature of the child's attachments varies. One should not conclude from the fact that
the final decision is correct (in the sense of minimizing prospective harm to the child) that
there is no harm done by the commitment and the reinforcement of the initial error. The
best decision from the child's perspective is a decision that avoids error altogether.
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Most child protective proceedings are significantly protracted. Moreover, in the
typical case the evidence is less than overwhelming. The overall impact of the
sequentiality effect upon child protective proceedings is therefore considerable.
Errors caused by inattention to sequentiality can go either way. In the
absence of other sources of decisionmaking bias or error, we would expect
that such errors would be distributed more or less symmetrically around the
"unskewed decision." However, as we will show, other sources of bias exist
in child abuse decisionmaking, and the effects of these biases are sustained by
the sequentiality effect.
III. Sources of Bias
We now turn to the factors that can cause deviations from the "unskewed
decision" defined above. We assume that the judge is not so rigidly bound by
legal rules that there is no room for the play of extra-legal influences. At each
decision point, the judge will have a wide range of discretion, for charges of
neglect and abuse are adjudicated within relatively flexible rule systems. It may
be that the judge will be required to assume jurisdiction or to order a
placement on the basis of something as concrete as a laboratory finding that
a child was born with a narcotic drug in its veins,42 but it is more likely that
decisions about jurisdiction and about preliminary and final disposition will be
loosely guided. In New York, for example, a preliminary disposition may be
based on a determination that there is or is not imminent danger to the child's
life or health.43 The jurisdictional decision may be based on a determination
that the child has or has not suffered impairment as a result of the
respondent's failure to exercise a "minimum degree of care." 44 The final
disposition is based upon the classic and notoriously vague "best interests"
standard.45
We anticipate the play of extra-legal influences without implying improper
behavibr on the part of the judge. We simply acknowledge that rule systems
are not sufficiently rigid to predetermine all cases and that factors not referenced in the rules will affect decisionmaking in those cases which are not
predetermined by the terms of the governing rule system. In acknowledging the
play of extra-legal influences, we abandon abstract and ideal models of judging
in favor of a behavioral model.
There are reasons to expect that the judge in a child abuse case will make

42. See Fla Stat Ann S 415.503(9)(a)(2) (West 1993); Ill Ann Stat ch 705, S 405/23(1)(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp 1994); Ind Code Ann S 31-6-4-3.1(1)(B) (West Supp 1994);
Mass Gen Laws Ann ch 119, S 51A (West 1993); Nev Rev Stat S 432B.330(1)(b) (1991);
10 Okla Stat Ann S 1101(4)(a)(3) (West Supp 1995). See generally Dorothy E. Roberts,

Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right to

Privacy, 104 Harv
43. NY Family
44. NY Family
45. NY Family

L Rev 1419 (1991).
Court Act SS 1022(a)(ii), 1027(b).
Court Act S 1012(f)(i).
Court Act S 1052(b).
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optimal decisions despite the looseness of the rule system in which s/he
operates. First, judicial decisionmaking concerns the welfare of a person other
than the decisionmaker.4 We expect, and the legal system seems to assume,
that the detachment associated with the judicial perspective will result in more
nearly optimal behavior. Moreover, as a result of legal training and socialization in a professional culture, judges have developed what we call a "professional stance." This professional stance requires not only adherence to the rule
systems that structure and guide judicial decisionmaking, but also a selfconscious effort to remain objective and to balance competing concerns fairly
and dispassionately.
Notwithstanding judges' relative objectivity and professional stance, certain
biasing effects seem endemic to the judicial system in general and to the
adjudication of child protective matters in particular.
A. STATUS Quo BIAS

Empirical evidence concerning choice behavior shows that people fail in two
seemingly related contexts to make choices that maximize gains. Kahneman and
Tversky identify (a) an endowment effect, such that people demand more to give
up something than they would offer to acquire it and (b) a status quo bias, such
that people prefer a current state to a more advantageous change.47 They argue
that both the endowment effect and the status quo bias are driven by loss aversion-an asymmetry of valuation such that losses are more painful than foregone
gains. 4' The disutility of giving up a status or an object is higher than the utility
associated with acquiring it. The legal system has long recognized this fact of
human nature. Oliver Wendell Holmes described what has come to be called loss
aversion:
It is in the nature of a man's mind. A thing which you have enjoyed and
used as your own for a long time, whether property or an opinion, takes
root in your being and cannot be torn away without your resenting the act
and trying to defend yourself, however you came by it. The law can ask no
better justification than the deepest instincts of man. 49
Other scholars have offered different explanations for the endowment effect

46. There is one qualification to this assertion. See text accompanying notes 63-65.
47. Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model, 106 Q J Econ 1039, 1041-44 (1991).
48. The literature on loss aversion and status quo bias is summarized in Daniel
Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard Thaler, Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss
Aversion and Status Quo Bias, 5 J Econ Perspectives 193 (1991). A theoretical consumer
choice model capturing these ideas is presented in Tversky and Kahneman, 106 Q J Econ
at 1039 (cited in note 47). See also Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, Choices, Values
and Frames, 39 Am Psychologist 1325 (1984).

49. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 Harv L Rev 455, 477
(1897).
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and the status quo bias. In. experimental research building on the work of
Kahneman and Tversky, Ritov and Baron have produced evidence that people
avoid a change of circumstance when, but only when, the change requires (or is
characterized so that it seems to require) action rather than passive acquiescence.5 o This research, taken together with the theoretical insight that choice
entails evaluation of the risks of regret as well as the risks of loss,"1 suggests
that the endowment effect and the status quo bias are motivated less by aversion
to loss than by aversion to feeling, being, or seeming to be responsible for a
negative outcome. This conclusion is consistent with experimental findings
suggesting that people are more risk-averse when they expect to learn the
outcome of their choices than when they expect to be protected from knowledge
of their mistakes.5 2 However irrational it may be, people feel more responsible
but
for their actions than for their omissions. They may, therefore, avoid actions
53
fail to avoid omissions that subject them to the risk of known failure.
The status quo bias has potentially significant consequences in child welfare
decisionmaking. The existence of status quo bias implies a tendency to maintain
the current state against changes in either direction, even in a category of cases
in which change would be optimal. To the extent that judges in child abuse cases
are vulnerable to this bias, they will be inclined to continue an existing custodial
arrangement, and they will be inclined to do so in at least some cases in which
a custodial change is warranted.
We can flesh out this tendency by reference to the explanatory theories
described above. The concept of loss aversion suggests that if the child has been
removed on an emergency basis in advance of the first hearing, the judge is likely
to value-and want to hold on to-the perceived safety of the intervention. S/he
will therefore manifest a bias in favor of maintaining the status quo of intervention. The responsibility hypothesis suggests that if the child has experienced a
pre-trial removal, the judge is likely to shun responsibility for the risk associated
with the action of returning the child. S/he will therefore manifest a bias in favor
of the seemingly more passive course of leaving things as they are. 4 If the child

50. Ilana Ritov and Jonathan Baron, Status-Quo and Omission Biases, 5 J Risk & Uncertainty 49 (1992).

51. See Graham Loomes and Robert Sugden, Disappointment and Dynamic Consistency
in Choice Under Uncertainty, 53 Rev Econ Stud 271 (1986); Graham Loomes and Robert
Sugden, Regret Theory: An Alternative Theory of Rational Choice Under Uncertainty, 92
Econ J 805 (1982).
52. See Robert Josephs, et al, Protecting the Self From the Negative Consequences of
Risky Decisions, 62 J Personality & Soc Psych 26 (1992).

53. See Ritov and Baron, 5 J Risk & Uncertainty at 60 (cited in note 50),
54. Legislators, litigators, and judges should be aware that the extent to which an
order such as continuing a remand to placement is perceived as active or passive is largely
governed by the ways in which the action is characterized in the discourse of the proceeding. See Ritov and Baron, 5 J Risk & Uncertainty at 61 ("[Sltatus quo biases can be
counteracted by changing the way in which options are presented to a decision maker.")
(cited in note 50). For a thorough analysis of the effects of narrative framing upon legal
decisionmaking, see Anthony G. Amsterdam and Randy Hertz, An Analysis of Closing
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is the subject of a proceeding but has not been placed in care, we believe that the
status quo is ambiguous. On the one hand, the judge may perceive a state of intervention and associate with that state a condition of safety from whatever risks
might exist in the child's home. On the other hand, the judge may perceive a
state of potential intervention and associate with that state a condition of
custodial stability. If the judge perceives a state of relative safety, s/he may be
unduly reluctant to forego that safety for the child (or to take action that will
put the child again at risk). If the judge perceives a state of relative stability, s/he
may be unduly reluctant to forego that stability for the child (or to take action
that will disrupt that stability). The factual details of the case and the characterizations of competing advocates may be particularly influential in these more
ambiguous cases. If we are correct about the ambiguity of the status quo in cases
in which a judicial proceeding has been initiated, judges are never called upon to
decide custody in the context of an unambiguous status quo of custodial stability."5 The status quo bias is therefore more likely to skew decisionmaking in the
direction of intervention. 6 As we show below, the effects of the status quo bias,
or of any other bias operating at this stage, will be magnified in later stages of
the proceeding by the sequentiality effect.
B.

SKEW IN THE ASSESSMENT OF RISK

Skew in the assessment of risk in child protective proceedings has two
principal sources: (a) problems of focus and emphasis that limit consideration of
some risks and exaggerate consideration of others and (b) special vulnerabilities
that make judges averse to some, but not all, risks.
1. Problems of focus and emphasis.
Resource disparities often affect the extent to which the attention of the
court is called to facts and theories relevant to risk assessment in child protective
proceedings. The overwhelming majority of respondents in child protective
proceedings are indigent, 7 and while they are usually entitled to court-appointArgument to a Jury, 37 NY L Sch L Rev 55 (1992).
55. It does not follow that there are no neglect or abuse cases in which judges
confront a status quo of custodial stability. If the petitioning agency does not seek interim
custodial change, then the child may appear at the moments of fact-finding and disposition
to enjoy custodial stability. However, the appearance of stability conveyed in a case in
which there is no application for interim placement may be mitigated for the same reasons
that the appearance of stability conveyed in a case in which there has been no emergency
placement is ambiguous: the judge may (but, of course, may not) regard the child as in
a state of imminent or potential intervention.
56. This skew may not exist in decisionmaking by child welfare professionals at the
level of fieldwork. In the fieldwork context, decisionmakers are more likely to perceive a
state of custodial stability and may, therefore, be influenced by a status quo bias against
intervention. If this difference exists, and if it is substantial, it may suggest that judges are
more prone than caseworkers to erroneous interventions, but caseworkers are more prone
than judges to fail to intervene when necessary.
57. See Randy Hertz, Martin Guggenheim, and Anthony G. Amsterdam, Trial Manual
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ed counsel, 8 the quality of that representation is likely to be poor. 9 On the
other hand, the resources of wealthier parents can overwhelm those of the public
agencies that prosecute cases of neglect and abuse. Where the resources of the
prosecuting agency are greater, it is likely that risks of non-intervention will be
exaggerated. Where the resources of the parents are greate; it is likely that risks
of intervention will be exaggerated. Since most respondents in neglect and abuse
proceedings are poor, the former circumstance is substantially more likely to
occur.

Consideration of the risks of intervention and of non-intervention can be
skewed even in cases in which resources are equal. A child protective proceeding
is brought for the purpose of considering the risk that a child will be harmed by
the respondent, usually a parent. It is inescapably in the nature of such a proceeding that the possibility of past and future neglect or abuse within the
respondent's home will be explored. The proceeding, by its very nature,
highlights the dramatic and tangible risk that a child will be harmed at the hands
of a person who has been identified as a possible risk to that child. Weighing
such a risk is anxiety-provoking; fear of an error that causes harm to a child is
deep, appropriate, and disquieting. Judges cannot fail to take account of the risk
of neglect or abuse in the respondent's home, but they may neglect to take
account of the not-insignificant risk that the child will suffer harm as a result of
being in official care.60 Moreover, even in cases in which litigation resources are
constant, it is possible that the more dramatic and tangible risks of abuse or
neglect by the respondent will overshadow the less dramatic and tangible risks of
family separation and substitute care. This overshadowing is appropriate where
the severity and probability of harm in the parental home are both great, but
inappropriate where these factors are small and the probability and severity of
psychological or developmental harm as a result of family separation are
great. "'

for Defense Attorneys in Juvenile Court 5 41.02(b) at 956 (ALI, 1991) (finding that the
vast majority of child protective proceedings involve children of the poor). It is not clear,
of course, how much this fact has to do with differing levels of neglect and abuse and
how much it has to do with differing levels of official supervision. For an exploration of
the thesis that the poor experience more intense and invasive supervision, see Jacobus
tenBroek, California's Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin, Development and Present
Status, 16 Stan L Rev 257 (1964); Jacobus tenBroek, California's Dual System of Family
Law: Its Origin, Development and Present Status, 17 Stan L Rev 614 (1965).
58. See Hertz, Guggenheim, and Amsterdam, Trial Manual for Defense Attorneys in Juvenile Court S 42.01 at 969 (cited in note 57).
59. See American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section, Ad Hoc Committee on the
Indigent Defense Crisis 1 (1993) (citing Department of Justice statistics to demonstrate that
of seventy-four billion dollars spent on the justice system nationwide, only 2.3 percent was
expended for attorneys representing indigent defendants).
60. These harms include the harm of familial separation, the disruption of school,
friendship, or community ties, the risks of multiple placements, and the risks of neglect or
abuse in foster care.
61. The psychology of the judge can also skew focus, and with it the analysis of risk.
An unconscious identification with the child, or with the presenting agency, may cause a
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2. Feedback vulnerabilities.
We have observed in the context of our discussion of status quo bias that
decisionmaking is affected by human reaction to the prospect of learning that
one has been responsible for a negative outcome.6 2 The prospect of learning
whether one of two alternative courses will turn out to be unfortunate will cause
a bias in favor of the course that poses less risk of regret. Adverse consequences
of failures to intervene are often conspicuous, and sometimes notorious, whereas
adverse consequences of interventions are rarely measured or made known to the
court or to the public at large. Decisionmaking in child protective proceedings is
therefore subject to skew, for decisionmakers have great reason to fear that they
will be made to regret a wrongful decision not to intervene and little reason to
fear that they will be made to regret a wrongful decision to intervene.
The child welfare decisionmaker who opts against intervention is, then,
vulnerable to the personal pain of knowing that s/he has been-however indirectly-responsible for harm to a child. S/he is also vulnerable to public exposure
and reprisal. Judges are public figures who receive feedback that allows them to
gauge the extent to which they are perceived, within and without the legal
community, as responsible, competent, and respected decisionmakers. Both the
careers of judges and the viability of the judicial system depend upon the quality
of that feedback. Media attention and the informal criticisms that come from
advocates, lay observers, and human service professionals are important sources
of this feedback in the culture of the family court. Just as judges are more likely
to learn of a regrettable failure to intervene than of a regrettable intervention,
they are more likely to receive negative informal and media feedback as a result
of a decision to leave a child in an allegedly neglectful or abusive home. In some
communities there may be feedback in reaction to family interventions,63 but
the specter of a headline announcing that a child has suffered injury or death as
a result of being returned to its parents looms more realistically for most judges
and may cause some to deviate from the norm of unskewed decisionmaking.
IV. The Interaction of Bias and Sequentiality
We have said that the final custody decision may depend, in an indirect but
important manner, on the initial custody decision. We rely upon our description
of status quo bias to clarify the bases of that assertion. To the extent that a
decisionmaker irrationally prefers the status quo, that decisionmaker will fail to
correct errors where correction requires deviation (or action to deviate) from the

judge to overestimate risks of parental abuse, whereas an unconscious identification with
the parents may cause a judge to underestimate those risks. Since we have no basis for
predicting the direction of this bias, we assume that it operates randomly.
62. See text accompanying notes 50-53.
63. See, for example, Dana Mack, Kids, Cops, and Caseworkers: America's Newest
Parent Traps, Wash Post C3 (Jan 30, 1994) (arguing that there is "an epidemic of overreporting" of child neglect and abuse).
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status quo. Each of the biases we have described, including the status quo bias,
has an impact on the litigation identical to that of an increase in the "regret (or
utility) matrix" of the decisionmaker: it increases the quantity of proof necessary
to produce a decision against the direction of the bias." As a result, it produces
errors.
This process is illustrated in Figure 1.
I---------------I------------
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Interventionist Bias
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Non-Interventionist Bias

point at which evidence rests
D supplemental proof required to overcome bias

o

-point

at which bias is overcome

Fig. 1. The effects of bias
The line represents the series of points at which the sum of the evidence
might rest. At the center point, the evidence for and against intervention is equal.
At points left of center, the evidence increasingly favors non-intervention; at
points right of center, the evidence increasingly favors intervention. The solid dot
represents the point at which the evidence rests in a hypothetical case. The oval
represents the effects of bias; it marks the amount of supplemental proof required to overcome a bias. An open dot represents the point at which a biased
decisionmaker will decide as if the evidence rested at the solid dot. In order to
persuade a biased decision-maker, a litigant must present evidence that surpasses
the requisite quantity of proof by the amount represented by the oval.
In Figure 2, it is assumed that the evidence slightly favors non-intervention
and that the decisionmaker is biased in favor of intervention. This hypothetical
decision-maker will decide to intervene even though the evidence does not
warrant intervention.

64. See generally Richard Lempert and Stephen Saltzburg, A Modem Approach to Evidence: Text, Problems, Transcripts and Cases 219 (West, 1977); John Kaplan, Decision
Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 Stan L Rev 1065, 1071-77 (1968).
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Fig. 2. Error producing interventionist bias

Figure 3 represents a decisionmaker with an interventionist bias in a case in
which the evidence overwhelmingly favors non-intervention. This decisionmaker
will make a correct decision despite the presence of bias.

Fig. 3. Harmless interventionist bias
When bias causes error in an interim custodial decision, that error is compounded by an independent bias-the status quo bias in favor of continuing the
interim custodial arrangement. It is this compounding that we have described
above as the sequentiality effect. An erroneous decision to place the child under
protective custody will enhance the likelihood of a final judgment of placement;
an erroneous interim decision to leave the child with its parents will enhance the
likelihood of a final judgment of dismissal or limited supervision.
Figure 4 illustrates this point. In stage one, a biased and erroneous decision
to intervene produces a status quo bias in stage two that combines with the preexisting bias to cause an intervention that is substantially against the weight of
the evidence.
I----

-

---

- -O--

- -

----

I

I StageI

I Stage Il
Fig. 4. Bias compounded between periods-an example

As we have said, in cases involving custodial decisions, the effect of arguments against custodial change will, over time, augment the effect of the status
quo bias. The sequentiality effect is therefore especially potent in any protracted
and less-than-conclusive case.
Each source of bias identified above has the potential of being compounded
by the sequentiality effect.6" To the extent that loss aversion causes a trial judge

65. Even the status quo bias itself can be compounded by the sequentiality effect,
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to err in the preliminary phases of a proceeding on the side of preserving the
safety of intervention or the stability of non-intervention, that error is likely, in
marginal or protracted cases, to persist despite evidence that exposes it as error.
To the extent that resource disparities cause judges acting in the early phases to
examine more closely the risks of intervention or of non-intervention, resultant
errors are likely to persist through disposition. To the extent that the obscure
quality of the risks of intervention mutes early inhibitions against family disruption, those inhibitions are likely to be entirely silenced. To the extent that the
risk of informal and media criticism makes a judge averse in the early stages to
the risk of intervention or of non-intervention, that aversion is likely to persist.
V. Recommendations
Decisionmaking in child protective proceedings is thought to be alarmingly
bad, leading at times to calamitous failures to intervene and at times to hurtful
and patently unwarranted family disruptions. 6 We have undertaken to formalize, in a very modest way, the decisionmaking process of judges in child protective proceedings. We have done so because the process of modeling facilitates
identification of systemic risks of bias. Our analysis has uncovered a greater
number of risks of unwarranted intervention than risks of unwarranted nonintervention. We realize that other students of the process, with perspectives and
insights different from ours, may well identify other systemic risks and may find
that the balance of risk tips in the other direction. It is important that judges,
practitioners, and commentators continue the analytic process begun here to
uncover sources of unwitting bias in child welfare decisionmaking. However, it
is also important to develop consciousness-raising strategies with respect to the
risks that we have been able to identify in this initial effort. We first present
recommendations to minimize the error-producing consequences of the sequentiality effect as it interacts with the status quo bias. We then offer recommendations to minimize the risks of bias from resource disparities, from the respondent-centered focus of proceedings, and from the feedback vulnerabilities 'of
decisionmakers.
A. MANAGING THE SEQUENTIALITY EFFECT
We have said that judges should protect against the sequentiality effect's
error-compounding potential by (a) taking care that early decisions are as
balanced and accurate as possible and (b) taking care that a final disposition is
reached as expeditiously as possible. Each of these recommendations warrants
elaboration.

magnifying the effects of a judicial focus on the custodial status of the child at the time
the case is first considered.
66. See the text accompanying notes 23-27.
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1. Balance and accuracy in early custodial decisionmaking.
Our analysis of the sequentiality effect and the status quo bias suggests that
errors at the early phases of child protective proceedings are likely to be selfreinforcing. When a judge errs on the side of intervention, that intervention
becomes the status quo from which deviation will be difficult in later phases of
the proceeding. When a judge errs on the side of non-intervention, relative 7
custodial stability becomes the status quo from which deviation will be difficult.
Several steps can be taken to avoid the error-producing consequences of the
status quo bias and the sequentiality effect. First, the attention of the judge can
be called to the need to make what we refer to as a "non-myopic" decision. 8
If a judge is myopic-if s/he fails to look beyond the preliminary decision s/he is
asked to make-s/he may consider that decision correctable and relatively
unimportant. S/he will therefore have little reason to resist a bias in favor of
perceived safety or stability. If, on the other hand, the judge appreciates the
effect that an initial decision is likely to have upon subsequent decisions, s/he will
have reason to inquire more deeply to avoid a self-reinforcing error. This nonmyopic stance can be encouraged in a variety of ways. Direct discussion of the
sequentiality effect will make judges and litigators aware of the consequences
that can flow from cutting corners in the adjudication of applications for interim
interventions.
This same message can be conveyed or reinforced by the terms and structure
of laws authorizing interim interventions. Interim hearings must be held expeditiously and need not await the quantity and quality of proof that would be
appropriate at a final hearing. Moreover, placement may be appropriate as an
interim measure, on a lesser or different showing than is necessary for a finding
of neglect or abuse. Nonetheless, a statute authorizing interim intervention might
require a standard of proof at least as great as that required for a final determination.
Authorizing legislation can also serve to frame the issue of interim custody
in a way that calls attention to both the negative and the positive possible
consequences. Interim placements can protect children from ongoing or imminent
abuse or gross neglect, but they can also harm children by breaking the perceived
security of the family home, by forcing the child to forge new bonds that may or
may not survive final disposition, by exposing the child to the risks and inadequacies of institutional or foster care, and by increasing the likelihood of an
unnecessary and erroneous final order of placement. These competing risks may
be better balanced in the context of a statutory requirement that placement be

67. For an explanation of the notion that pre-trial custodial stability is a more
ambiguous situation than interim placement, see note 55.
68. In using the term "non-myopic," we do not wish to incorporate from multi-level
decision theory the notion that a correct or rational outcome can be discerned by taking
into account known contingencies at later stages. The fact of sequentiality in this context
bears no implications as to the correct decision; the sequentiality effect simply alerts us to
the importance of avoiding error at the early stages.
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ordered only where the harms to the child of family disruption, the risks associated with substitute care, and the risks of facilitating a final order of foster
placement are substantially outweighed by the risk of harm to the child in the
respondent's home. These same points can, of course, be made by advocates for
the parents or for the children even in the absence of such legislation.
Evidence that decisionmakers are minimizing their regret when they expect
to know the consequences of their actions suggests that judges will make better
interim decisions if they are routinely informed of the consequences of interim
decisions, whichever way they go. If there are reports to the court concerning
any adverse reactions a child might have, either as the result of remaining at
home or as the result of interim placement, then bias will be minimized by the
expectation that regret will be possible whether the perceived status quo is
maintained or disrupted.
Our aiialysis of the status quo bias suggests that interim decisions are more
likely to err on the side of intervention. The foregoing recommendations are
neutral in that they protect against the error-producing consequences of sequentiality regardless of the direction of decisionmaking bias. The more specific
tendency to err preliminarily on the side of perceived safety can be countered by
providing the judge with interim alternatives that seem safer than outright denial
of the request for placement but do not have the self-reinforcing potential of
interim placement. Thus, legislation might require consideration of less drastic
interim dispositional alternatives, such as family supervision, home visits, or
services for children and families at risk as the result of inadequate resources.69
We have said that the status quo bias may be most potent when change
requires action and when the decisionmaker expects to know the consequences
of that action."0 The judge who is called upon to order an interim intervention
will, in some sense, be required to act in response. S/he must either grant or deny
the motion. However, the extent to which the judge senses that the grant or
denial of an application for an interim intervention is an action rather than an
acquiescence in an existing or developing state of affairs is a matter of perception
and characterization to which the skilled litigator will attend with care. Whether
or not the child has been removed in advance of the court appearance, the
requested action may be characterized as authorization of a family disruption or
as validation of an ongoing state of rescue. If, as we suspect, the judge is likely
to regard the agency actions preceding the first court hearing as the beginning of
an intervention (and therefore more likely to experience a status quo bias in
favor of placement), then the bias may be offset by characterizations-both in
official terminology and in the arguments of counsel-that stress the active nature of an interim order of placement. If, for example, a respondent's children

69. In 1986, 13,329 children entered foster care in New York City as a result of lack
of food, clothing, or shelter. Manhattan Borough President's Advisory Council on Child
Welfare, Failed Promises at 25 (cited in note 2). A 1988 ,survey of foster children in that
same city found that nearly four hundred children could be returned home immediately if
their parents were able to secure adequate housing. Id at 33.
70. See text accompanying notes 50-53.
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have been removed on an emergency basis without prior hearing, that respondent
will in all jurisdictions have an opportunity to be heard with respect to the
appropriateness of the pre-trial intervention. The issue at such a hearing might
be characterized as a decision whether to order placement pending trial (assuming the expiration of the emergency placement) or it might be characterized as a
decision whether to continue placement pending trial (assuming that the emergency placement does not expire). Overcoming the inclination to maintain the
status quo may be easier if the respondent argues against an order authorizing
pretrial placement (upon the expiration of a fixed-term emergency placement)
than if s/he argues for a return of the children. These issues of framing should be
taken into account in the drafting of authorizing legislation.
2. Expeditious decisionmaking.
A custody proceeding should be as expeditious as possible, consistent with
thorough and balanced consideration of competing risks to the child. This
recommendation reinforces those of countless commentators who have argued
for promptness in the determination and review of child custody matters.7 The
sequentiality effect produces a potential for error or injustice72 that is most
potent in protracted proceedings in which there has been an interim order of
placement. In those cases, the bias in favor of continuing an interim order is
compounded by operation of the maxim in favor of continuity. The family bond
has been disrupted, the perceived safety of intervention has become the status
quo, and the child has begun the process of becoming dependent upon new
bonds. Trial and appellate courts should therefore regard these cases as emergencies requiring priority and expedited decision.
It will sometimes happen that pre-trial investigation reveals facts that call
into question an interim award of placement. Our recommendation that judges
be provided feedback concerning the consequences of interim custodial orders (or
denials thereof) would make revelations of this kind more likely. Action to correct a self-reinforcing error should not be delayed. When final disposition is not
possible within a prescribed period, courts should revisit the question of interim
custody to ensure that placement remains consistent with the weight of available
evidence.
B.

MANAGING SKEW IN THE ASSESSMENT OF RISK

1. Avoiding or compensating for resource disparities.
Risk assessment can be improved by the avoidance of litigation imbalances

71. See, for example, Goldstein, Freud and Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests at 42
(cited in note 14) (recommending that "decisionmakers . . . act with 'all deliberate speed'
to maximize each child's opportunity either to restore stability to an existing relationship
or to facilitate the establishment of new relationships").
72. As we have shown, injustices may occur as a result of the sequentiality effect even
though the ultimate decision is correct in terms of the prospective interests of the child.
See note 41.
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and by judicial efforts to compensate for those that do occur. The complexities
and difficulties of successful advocacy in child protective proceedings are often
underestimated.7 Judges should be sensitive to the opportunities for enlightenment-both about case facts and about theoretical insights relevant to the
interpretation of facts and legal standards-that good advocates can provide.74
Moreover, they should seize these opportunities in the service of revealing the
risks associated both with intervention and with non-intervention. Legislators
should ensure that it is within a judge's power to provide resources for the
investigatory work, expert assistance, and case preparation that the seriousness
and consequences of a child protective proceeding appropriately command.
2. Ensuring balanced and child-centered decisionmaking in a respondentfocused proceeding and in the face of vulnerability to feedback and regret.
We have met the risk of bias in interim decisionmaking with recommendations that decisionmakers be required to give explicit consideration to factors
relevant to intervention and to non-intervention. Risk assessment can be improved by the same means: the risks of intervention and of non-intervention
should be given explicit attention at every stage at which custody is determined
or continued. The ideal of non-skewed decisionmaking requires that rule systems
facilitate balanced consideration of competing risks by forcing explicit review of
each set. This can be accomplished through requirements of written findings with
respect to specified risks associated with placement and with continued custody
by the respondent.
This recommendation is neutral in form and should work to address bias in
either direction. We have observed that child protective proceedings are formally
focused upon the possible wrongdoing of the respondent rather than on the
welfare of the child. We have also observed that the decisionmaker is vulnerable
to negative feedback and regret as the result of a failure to intervene, but not as
a result of intervention. To the extent that these two factors leave decisionmakers
biased in favor of intervention, the required canvassing of risks of intervention
will provide a useful check against bias. In the case of a judge whose deliberations might be affected by the greater strength of the respondent's advocates or
by an identification with the parents, the required canvassing of risks of nonintervention will provide a similarly useful check.
None of these recommendations is a panacea. Nonetheless, we believe that
their selective application to particular child welfare systems, together with ongoing analyses of the kind modeled above to identify and counter systemic bias,
will take us closer to the goal of child welfare decisionmaking that is balanced,
non-myopic, and child-focused.

73. See Peggy Cooper Davis, A Woman's Challenge (A Tribute to the Honorable Judith
Kaye), 1994 Ann Surv Am L xxxiii, xxxiv-xxxvii (discussing the complexities of family
court litigation and the tendencies of courts to deny or avoid those complexities).
74. See Peggy C. Davis, "There is a Book Out . . . ": An Analysis of Judicial

Absorption of Legislative Facts, 100 Harv L Rev 1539, 1594-1600 (1987).

